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A THEORY OF THE STABILITY OF PUNISHMENT
ALFRED BLUMSTEIN* AND JACQUElINE COHEN**
One of the more interesting theses advanced by
Durkheim, and subsequently by others, is that
crime is a "normal" and not a pathological attri-
bute of society "provided that it attains and does
not exceed a certain level for each social type." I
Durkheim meant by this that a particular level of
crime is "an integral part of all healthy societies." 2
Far from being some aberrant form of societal
maladjustment, it is a necessary result of the same
phenomena which promote and maintain social
solidarity.3
For Durkheim, the essential mechanism con-
tributing both to the stability of a society and to
the natural occurrence of crime was the "collective
conscience" or "the totality of beliefs and senti-
ments common to average citizens of the same
society." 4 When these beliefs and sentiments are
held strongly by most of the members of a society,
they form the social glue which binds the indi-
viduals in the society together. Yet, because of the
unavoidable individual variations in the degree to
which these sentiments are held, there will always
be persons whose individual embodiment of the
collective conscience is insufficiently developed.
As a result, these persons will often engage in
actions which are a serious affront to the collective
conscience, and thereby defined as criminal.
The collective conscience, then, provides a
cognitive structure which serves as the basis for
* Director, Urban Systems Institute, Carnegie-
Mellon University.
** Research Assistant, Urban Systems' Institute,
Carnegie-Afellon University.
£ E. DURKHEIM, TiE RULES OF SOCIOLOGICAL
M.THOD 66 (S. Solovav & J. Mueller transls. 1964).
2 Id. at 07.
• It should be emphasized that Durkheini was quick
to point out that societal normality should not be cotn-
fused with individual normality. While the existence of
some crime is normal for society, that does not mean
that the individual criminals are to be considered nor-
nial. The fact that there are persons with poor control
meclanisns may be determined by the social structure,
but these persons are, nevertheless, maladjusted at the
level of the individual. Similarly, he maintains that
while crimc is nornmal that does not mean that it should
not be regarded with displeasure. Just as a pain is a
normal, yet uncomfortable attribute for biological
organisms, so crime is a normal, but abhorrent feature
of social life.
I E. DURKHEIM, TnE DivisIoN OF LABOR IN SOCIETY
79 (G. Simpson transl. 1964).
organizing individuals into a collectivity by pro-
viding them with a group identity. At the same
time this structure partitions the class of possible
and actual behaviors into those which are accepta-
ble and those which are unacceptable, thereby
creating the possibility of crime. That is, actions
can only be deemed as criminal in the context oi a
body of rules held in common and governing the
way men live together.
One of the more recent attempts to document
this Durkheimian notion is the work of-Kai Erik-
son. 5 Once again, the presence of crime in societies
is regarded as natural and emanating from the
same process which preserves s-ocial stability.
Erikson, however, speaks of this fundamental
process in the less esoteric terms of boundary
maintenance, which is the continual clarification
of the normative outlines of a particular social
group. As the cultural integrity of the group is
specified and reinforced, the phenomenon of crime
is also born.
In addition to accounting for the origin of crime,
both Durkheim and Erikson outline the subsequent
functional role of crime, or more accurately of the
social reaction to crime, for a social group. At the
same time that crime arises out of the mechanism
for social solidarity, the reaction to crime also
contributes to the maintenance of that social
solidarity-. As the society acts to punish the crimi-
nal, it also articulates the sentiments or norms
characteristic of the society and reinforces them
in its members. Thus, not only is crime in a society
natural, but the response to it serves a useful
purpose by continually clarifying and reaffirming
the essential beliefs which define that society.
An important corollary to the notion that crime
is both natural and functional for social life is that
the extent of crime in any particular social group
will generally be maintained at a specific level.
While the optimal level may vary with social
type, the observed level-in any given group will
rarely fall short of or exceed the relevant optimum.
Durkheim even suggests that it may be possible to
specify exactly the optimum level of crime for the
various social types. 6 Furthermore, Erikson's
K. ElzKsoN, TIE WAYWARD PURITA.s 3-29 (Ooo).
6 E. DURKIHEIM, supra note 1, at 66.
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work includes an attempt to offer some empirical
evidence for this claim.'
In this paper, the preceding analysis of the
existence of stable levels of crime will be critically
re-examined and an alternative position about the
constancy of punishinent will be offered. It is our
contention that in their discussions of criminality
and deviance both Durkheim and Erikson were
not referring to the class of all acts which would
be considered criminal or deviant if discovered.
Rather, they were concerned with only those acts
which are publicly recognized as criminal (deviant)
and punished in some way. An alternative account
of the stability of punishment is then developed
by formulating the phenomenon in terms of a
homeostatic process. Finally the analysis will be
subjected to empirical testing using data from the
United States and Norway.
Tim STABILITY OF PuNIsmi E '
At first glance the notion that there is a stable
level of crime for any society seems to have some
clear empirical implications which can be ex-
amined. A closer look, however, reveals that there
are enormous difficulties attending the measure-
ment of levels of crime. In the strict sense, the
level of crime would have to include any act which
is a violation of some criminal statute. This is,
however, extremely difficult if not impossible to
determine.
In the first place, not all crimes can be detected.
When a distinction is drawn between crimes with
victims, such as assault and robbery, and private
crimes, such as prohibited narcotics use or sexual
practices between consenting adults, it is apparent
that in the absence of extensive spying or self-
reporting, most private crimes will go undetected.
There are also an indeterminate number of victim
crimes which are never reported (this is most
common in the case of rape). Furthermore, even
in the cases where crimes are detected, there are
wide variations in the degree of enforcement and
in some cases a known infraction is completely
ignored by the authorities. Thus, while the leviel
of reported or detected crimes can be determined
with some effort, there is no way of knowing exactly
how many crimes have been perpetrated without
public awareness. It is, therefore, uninformative
to speak of a stable level of crime in this strict
sense.
There are indications in Durkheim's and Erik-
son's works that both men, when they speak of
7 K. EanxsoN, supra note 5, at 163-81.
stable levels of crime, are referring only to those
crimes which come to public attention through the
punishment of the wrongdoer. For example, Durk-
heim stated that "an act is criminal when it offends
strong and defined states of the collective con-
science." 8 Similarly, Erikson maintained that
"deviance is not a property inherent in. any par-
ticular kind of behavior; it is a property conferred
upon that behavior by the people who come into
direct or indirect contact with it." 9 Furthermore,
for both men a crime is known by the characteristic
reaction to it, namely its punishment. In each case,
the primary concern is with crimes for which there
is a public awareness of and response to the act.
The level of crime theyspeak of, then, includes only
those acts which are publicly recognized as crimes
and punished accordingly. Hence, it is not the
level of actual criminal behavior which is stable,
but rather the level of punished criminal acts.
A BEHAVIOR DISTRIBUTION AND
PuNIsHmENT THRESHoLDs
In order to explore the interaction between
behavior and its punishment, we posit a statistical
distribution of general form, fn(x), representing
the distribution of crime-related behavior in a
society. The notion of such a distribution is not
new; it has been used and discussed by Cavan0
and by Wilkins. The basic concept of the dis-
tribution reflects the diversity of conduct in any
society, ranging from the severely criminally
deviant to the compulsively moralistic. The general
structure of this distribution is depicted in Figure
1. For simplicity, we initially consider only the
one-dimensional distribution. The actual distribu-
tion is, of course, far more complex. The FBI, for
example, uses 29 crime types in its Uniform Crime
Reports, and even these are highly aggregated.
We can hypothesize that in this behavior space
a society establishes a boundary threshold, B0,
which defines unacceptable or criminal behavior,
that is, individuals who engage in behavior B > B0
are deemed to be punishable. We might introduce
here a punishment severity function, g(B), which
is monotonic increasing with B, to reflect the
expected severity of the punishment to be imposed
on an individual convicted of behavior B.
Under this model, we can then denote the
8 E. D UEXmH, supra note 4, at 80 (emphasis added).
9 K. EgXISON, supra note 5, at 6 (emphasis in origi-
nal).
10 R. Cavan, The Concepts of Tolerance and Contra-
culture as Applied to Delinquency, in 2 SOCIOLOGICAL Q.
243-58 (1961).
" L. WILIUNS, SOcIAL DEVANCE (1964).




punishment delivered by the society as the follow-
inglintegral:
,= L g(x)C(x)fB(x) dx (1)
where C(B) is the probability of the arrest and
conviction of someone who has engaged in behavior
B. This integral represents the gross punishment
meted out by the society. If C(B) represented the
rate of conviction of people engaged in behavior
B, then the integral a would represent a rate (say
an annual rate) of punishment.
We hypothesize here that in a given society,
during a relatively stable period, there is a balance
of forces that maintains a fairly constant. The
rationale for this argument is fundamentally that
the level of punishment in a society is homeostatic.
That is, there are a variety of processes in the
society which operate to maintain a constant level
of punishment, and this level adapts to changing
levels of actual crimes as reflected in shifts in the
behavior distribution. Under this hypothesis, if
behavior were to become less deviant through a
decrease in the occurrence of infractions (i.e., a
shift to the left in the behavior distribution), an
issue explored by both Durkheim12 and Erikson,13
then the society would respond according to
Durkheim's model by re-defining previously minor
infractions as crimes, and punishing these. The
result would be the stable maintenance of a rea-
sonable amount of punishment.
In this process, for instance, if a(Bo) decreases
as a result of the behavior shift, then we would see
the threshold reestablished to a new value,
Bo' < B0 , which encompasses more types of be-
havior as crimes, so that a'(Bo') = a(Bo) = a.
2 E. DuRxHEiM, =pra note 1.







On the other hand, if the population were to
become more deviant through a shift of the dis-
tribution to the right, then the society can choose
to retain the same punishment thresholds, B0,
and accept the consequently higher values of
punishment, a' > a. Alternatively, the society
could accommodate to the shift by revising its
standards toward greater leniency. It does so by
creating new thresholds, Be > Bo, or by creating
revised punishment procedures and adjusting
these such that the punishment integral, a, remains
constant. Thus:
a -- f g(x)C(x)fn(x) (2)
= J1 g'(x)C'(x)f'B(x) dx
The social factors accounting for this hypothe-
sized withdrawal reaction could certainly include
economic considerations. Increased punishment
implies increased expenditures for processing and
confinement as well as lost economic activity of
those punished, and the society may be unwilling
to undertake this increased economic burden. But
there would also be considerations of social sta-
bility, which try to avoid alienating too large a
portion of the population from the society by
labeling them and their associates as deviant, and
thereby risking the fundamental stability of the
society.
IMPRISONMENT RATE AS A MEASURE
OF PUNISMIENT
While the argument for a stable a may well be
reasonable, it is empty without some empirical
validation, which requires indications of a society's
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indicators. Among the possibilities are arrest rate,
conviction rate, imprisonment rate, and prison
populations. We first explore the imprisonment
rate and its time history as a measure of punish-
ment.
Even if these data prove to be stable, however,
this would still fall short of definitive proof of the
argument for a stable a. First, punishment takes
many forms in a society, and each form has its
characteristic severity. In addition to prisons, there
are juvenile institutions, mental institutions, and
various forms of community supervision and
restraint. Even prior to conviction, arrest and trial
represent punishment in themselves. Nevertheless,
we believe that the severity of punishment in
prison sufficiently dominates these other forms to
warrant principal attention initially. If the im-
prisonment data are found to be reliable and the
process is found to be stable, then it would be
appropriate to explore these other forms of punish-
ment to determine the stability of their time
trends.
Figure 2 depicts the imprisonment rate in the
United States in prisoners per 100,000 population
for the period 1930-1970.11 It can be seen from
,U. S. CENSUS BUREAU, STATISTICAL HISTORY OF
SUNIrrED STATES FROm COLONIAL TnExs TO PRESENT(1960). U. S. Dm'T or ConmmRE, STATISTICAL AB-
Figure 2 that over that period the imprisonment
rate was reasonably constant, having an average
value of 110.2 prisoners per 100,000 population
and a standard deviation during that time (as
shown by the dotted lines) of 8.9 prisoners per
100,000 population. The coefficient of variation is
thus 8.1 percent. The stability of the time series
is especially noteworthy when it is considered that
the population of the United States increased by
over 50 percent in this same period.
The anomalous points are principally those
during World War II (when the military repre-
sented an available alternative for many who might
otherwise have been in prison). Somewhat less
apparent is explanation for the peak around 1940.
Were the peak to have been in 1940 alone, then
the completeness of the census data for that year
might have been blamed. The peak, however,
spreads from 1938 to 1941, and so it could have
been a depression aftermath effect, a war pre-
cursor, or simply a smoothing factor applied to
smooth out a real 1940 peak. Even when these
anomalies are included, however, the rate remains
surprisingly stable.
The stability is more apparent in Figure 3, in
sTRAcT or THE UNIED STATEs-1970 (1970); U. S.
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which the data for the years 1938-1945 have been
dropped. The slightly revised mean is thus 109.6;
the standard deviation drops to 5.9, and the coeffi-
dent of variation is 5.4 percent.
It is interesting to note that the imprisonment
rate since 1961 has shown a distinct downward
trend. This is in marked contrast to the 31 percent
increase in reported arrests between 1960 and
1970. One possible explanation for the declining
imprisonment rate could be saturation of existing
institutions. It might be that all the available
prison cells are filled, and the increasing population
divided into the fixed number of prisoners would
cause the rate to decline. It turns out, however, as
shown in Table 1, that even the absolute number
of prisoners has been declining since 1961. Further-
more, there is considerable evidence that prisons
in the U.S. are far from saturated. In fact, there
has been an increasing tendency throughout most
of the nation for shorter prison sentences, for more
use of probation and for other forms of community
supervision.
CROSS-CULTURAL COMPARISON
It is reasonable to expect that even if the value
of a is constant, its value would vary from one
society to another. One would expect, in particular
that a more homogeneous society, with less varia-
bility in its behavior distribution would have an
imprisonment rate significantly lower than a more
heterogeneous society that is otherwise compara-
ble. This argument derives from a consideration of
the distance in the behavior distribution. An
individual with behavior B, < B 2 is presumed to
reject B2 and to exert some pressure for punishment
of B2. For a fixed B1, this pressure is hypothesized
to be a monotonic increasing function h(D) of the
distance D = B2 - B1. As the variance of the
behavior distribution increases, there is a greater
frequency of the larger distances, and hence a
higher imprisonment rate.
Similarly, one would expect that in two other-
wise similar societies, the more permissive would
have a lower a. Here, the two societies differ in
their h(D) function, with the operational definition
of "society 1 is more permissive than society 2"
being that hi(D) < h2(D).
With respect to a punitive society, it is less
dear how its punishment rate would respond. It
might be that a "disciplining" society would have
a higher value of a because it punishes more
severely (i.e., a higher value for the h function) or
it might have a lower value because its people are
more disciplined, (i.e., the variance of the fB(x)

































































































































































* See footnote 14, supra, for the three sources of data in this table.
** Including Armed Forces Overseas.
*** The prison population and rate for 1968 were unavailable. The rate was, therefore, estimated from the curve.
function has been reduced). The introduction of
punitive operations to a previously more permissive
society would be likely to generate immediately
a higher value of a. As stability was reached, then
deterrence would shift the behavior distribution
to the left, lowering a as a result. These dynamics
during a period of instability require further
exploration.
We have begun to explore the cross-cultural
aspects of this issue. Professor Nils Christie of the
University of Oslo has collected and provided us
with some of his data on Norwegian prisons. The
imprisonment rates for Norway for 1880 to 1964
are presented in Figure 4.15 The Norway data cover
85 years, a considerably longer time span than the
U.S. data. Again, the stability is dear, although
less striking than in the U.S. data. The mean
imprisonment rate is 52.5 prisoners per 100,000
population, with a standard deviation of 8.2 and a
coefficient of variation of 15.6 percent. As was
anticipated, the imprisonment rate is significantly
IsLetter from Nils Christie to Alfred Blumstein,
May 24, 1971.
lower than in the United States, presumably at
least in part because of the greater homogeneity
of the Norweigian population.
Similar comparisons are needed for other coun-
tries. Review of Christie's E data for other Scan-
dinavian countries seems to show effects similar to
those for Norway. Data from other countries are
needed to provide an appropriate mix of cultural
environments, historical trends, and characteristic
levels of punishment.
MULTmID NSIONALITY Op T=E BnnAvioR
DISmIBuTIoN
We can now turn to an exploration of the multi-
dimensional character of the behavior distribution.
In view of the variety of behavior labeled and
treated as "crime," it is necessary to deal with the
behavior variable, B, as a vector variable. The 29
separate categories of offenses in the Uniform
16 N. Christie, Changes in Penal Values, 2 Sc x-
DIAVIAN STUiES iN CRxIoMoOGY-AsPEcrs or
SocIAL CONTROL ix WEARE STATES (1968).
19731
A. BLUMSTEIN & JACQUELINE COHEN
60-








1880 85 0 s 19o 0 's i'o As 10 2 'O 3s do ,5 5b s 6b 6,
Frinua 4
ANNUAL IapmsoNmENT RATE IN NORWAY: 1880-1964
Crime Reports,17 for instance, include such inter-
nally diverse categories as other assaults, sex
offenses, disorderly conduct, and "all other offenses
(except traffic)."
Treating B as a vector requires a revision of
expression (1) as follows:
B1  Boo 3
•C(xi, ... , x,)fn(xi, --- , x.) dx ... dx.
In this case, then, changes can occur along any
of the dimensions of the behavior distribution.
Thus, some actual crime rates can increase while
others decrease. More severe punishment can be
imposed on some crimes while others receive more
gentle treatment. In particular, since B0 is now a
vector of the form (Bo,, Bo2, .- , Bo.), there is a
wide range of choices in setting the individual
B0 components subject only to the requirement
expressed in equation (3) above that the total
integral be a. Thus, as the behavior distribution
shifts, the threshholds for some serious crimes, say
murder and robbery, can remain fairly constant,
7 FEDRAL BUREAU OP INvESTIGATION, UNIyOIO
ClR REPoRTs (1970). The categories used are the
following: murder and nonnegligent manslaughter;
manslaughter by negligence; forcible rape; robbery;
aggravated assault; burglary; larceny; auto theft;
other assaults; arson; forgery and counterfeiting;
fraud; embezzlement; stolen property; vandalism;
weapons; prostitution; sex offenses; narcotic drug laws;
gambling; offenses against family and children; driving
under the influence; liquor laws; drunkenness; dis-
orderly conduct; vagrancy; all other offenses (except
traffic); suspicion; curfew.
while the B0 levels of some other components
change in order to maintain a constant a.
The prime candidates for more significant revi-
sion are the non-victim crimes. As the behavior
distribution shifts to the right (i.e., an increase
in the occurrence of criminal deviance), then the
society can become more lenient with respect to
such crimes. This leniency can take several forms.
The corresponding component of Bo can be in-
creased so that only the more serious version of that
behavior is dealt with (e.g., narcotics traffic rather
than use). Alternatively, the severity of the punish-
ment function, g(x), can be reduced by an increased
willingness on the part of prosecutors, judges, or
juries to drop charges or to use lesser charges.
Judges can reduce the punishment by more fre-
quent use of probation or suspended sentences.
Prison sentences can be shortened by either
changes in sentencing by judges or earlier release on
parole. All of these serve to reduce the contribution
to a by those offenses on which adaptation occurs.
These effects can be explored with the arrest
data for 1960, 1965 and 1970 reported in the 1970
Uniform Crime Reports (Table 2). During the
period 1960 to 1970, there was an increase of 31
percent in reported arrests with an increase of
over 20 percent in the second half of the decade
alone. During this same decade, the number of
reported index crimes increased by 176 percent
and the crime rate per population increased by 144
percent. 8 Similar increases were reported for the





TRENs IN UNITED STATES ARRESTS FOR SELECTED
CRIsx TYPES*
1970 Arrests8 Percentage Change inArrests
Crime Type
Number(in thou- at/ 1960-70b 195_700
sands) 100.000
Total 6,500.3 4,287.7 +31.0% +20.7%
Violentd 241.9 159.6 +83.2 +48.4
Propertyd 1,028.9 678.6 +87.4 +40.5
Robbery 87.7 57.8 +120.2 +80.5
Burglary 285.4 188.3 +61.6 +32.4
Larceny 616.1 406.4 +108.2 +51.1
Stolen Prop- 61.5 40.6 +358.5 +206.3
erty
Narcotics 346.4 228.5 +740.6 +575.0
Prostitution 49.3 32.5 +57.6 +37.4
Liquor Laws 222.5 146.7 +58.8 +13.9
Sex Offenses 49.3 32.5 -23.3 -22.3
Gambling 84.8 55.9 -38.1 -28.6
Drunkenness 1,512.7 997.8 -14.4 -8.5
Disorderly 589.6 388.9 +2.8 -6.4
Cond.
Vagrancy 101.1 66.7 -41.5 -17.2
Suspicion 70.2 46.3 -56.4 -18.4
Family/ 56.6 37.3 -5.6 -15.7
Children
* All crime types with a decrease in arrests are shown
in the table. Those crime types not shown changed at
rates similar to those indicated for the aggregated
categories of violent and property crimes.
The figures in each column are not directly compara-
ble since they are based on different reporting popula-
tions. The 1970 arrest figures in columns 1 and 2 are
the most complete indicating arrest data from all
agencies reporting in 1970. The percentage changes
from 1960 to 1970 and from 1965 to 1970 use subsets
of this data. In each case only data available from those
agencies reporting in both years (1960 and 1970, or
1965 and 1970) are used. The percentage changes,
therefore, represent changes in the number of arrests
for comparable population bases.
a Source: FEDERAL BUREAU OF IN VESTIGATION,
UNmroRm CRIME REPoRTs-1970 Table 23. See foot-
note 17 supra.
b Source: Id. at Table 24.
e Source: Id. at Table 25.
d The category of violent crimes includes murder
and non-negligent manslaughter, negligent manslaugh-
ter, forcible rape, robbery and aggravated assault.
Property crimes include burglary, larceny and auto
theft.
and for the crimes against property (180 percent
and 147 percent). There is considerable debate1 9
over how much of this increase is due to increases
in reporting rate, how much is due to the effects
of inflation (e.g., an increase in the price of bicycles
increases the number of index larcenies of $50 or
more), and how much is due to other non-be-
havioral shifts that cannot easily be calibrated.
Despite these uncertainties, it is generally ac-
cepted, as concluded by the President's Commis-
sion on Law Enforcement and the Administration
of Justice, that:
1. The number of offenses-crimes of violence,
crimes against property, and most others as well-
has been increasing. Naturally, population growth
is one of the significant contributing factors in the
total amount of crime.
2. Most forms of crime-especially crimes
against property-are increasing faster than popu-
lation growth.20
These conclusions were reached in 1966, when the
reported crime rate increase was less than in the
remaining years of the decade. It can thus reason-
ably be asserted that there was a significant shift
to the right in the United States' behavior dis-
tribution during the 1960's.
Table 2 lists only a selection of the large majority
of the crime types for which reported arrests have
increased. It lists all seven of the 29 crime types
whose reported arrests have decreased: sex of-
fenses, gambling, drunkenness, disorderly conduct,
vagrancy, suspicion, and offenses against family
and children. Aside from offenses against family
and children (which involve matters like non-sup-
port and desertion, and which may be more civil
than criminal in nature), these are all victimless
crimes, and are of the kind where the discretion
over B0 has the greatest flexibility.
The striking exception in this pattern of decline
in arrests for non-victim crimes is the violation of
narcotics and drugs laws for which arrests have in-
creased by 740 percent over the entire decade and
by 575 percent over its last five years. This rate of
increase in the drug law arrests is clearly con-
tradictory to the trends in the other victimless
10 See, e.g., 2 STAFF REPORTS or THE NATIONAL CoM-
MISSION ON THE CAUsES AND PRvEErNIoN or VIOMNcE
-Cmxs o" VIoLENcE (1969); M. Wolfgang, Uniform
Crime Reports: A Critical Appraisal, 111 U. PA. L.
REV. 708 (1963).
2 0 PRESDENT'S COMMISSION ON LAW ENORCEmENT
AND THE ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTIcE, TAsK FORCE
REPORT: CRmE AND ITS IMPAcT-AN ASSESSMENT 40
(1967).
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crimes. The explanation for this effect can only
result from a consideration of the dynamics of the
adaptation process. The shift of the Bo values in
response to shifts in the behavior distribution is
certainly not instantaneous. Rather, the B, shift
results from various forms of recognition of the
need for the shift, and a subsequent accommodation.
Thus, it may be hypothesized that during the
latter part of the sixties, drug abuse, including
marijuana and narcotics, expanded so rapidly (i.e.,
the behavior distribution rapidly moved to the
right on the narcotics-laws dimension) that any
revision of enforcement policies could not keep up
with that shift. The rapidity of the behavioral
shift is indicated by the fact that there was only
one narcotics arrest recorded in the Wolfgang
cohort of 9,945 Philadelphia boys who had amassed
10,214 arrests by the time they were 18 years old
in 1963.2
The sharp increase in drug law arrests has led
to a significant re-examination of the laws, and
several clear steps have been taken to increase Ba.
In the Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and
Control Act of 19 70 ' Congress changed possession
of marijuana for personal use from a felony to a
misdemeanor.u In 1972, the National Commission
on Marijuana and Drug Abuse recommended-that
possession of marijuana for personal use should no
longer be a federal or state offense 4 These moves
are clearly in the direction of a liberalized adap-
tation of Bo to the shifts in the behavior distribu-
tion, lagged perhaps by several years.
Thus, in the case of narcotics we see that a
transformation of the behavior distribution to the
right led to an increase in the punishment for drug
use, with an associated growth in a. A reaction
against this increase has led to the establishment
of new, more tolerant B, values. The dynamics of
this process, including assessment of the time lags
in the response system, still need further explo-
ration.
The 359 percent increase in the number of ar-
rests for stolen property is also illuminating. The
criminal justice system can maintain a constant
a, not only by moving Bo, but also by adjusting
21 M. WoiLGANG, R. FIGLIo & T. SELLIN, DE-
LINQUENCY IN A BmTH COHORT 69 (1972).
=The Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and
Control Act of 1970, 84 Stat. 1236 (codified in scattered
sections of 21, 42 U.S.C.).
' 21 U.S.C. § 844 (1972).
24 REPORT OF? THE NATIONAL COMMISSION ON
MARIJUANA AND DRUG ABUSE-MARIJUANA: A SIGNAL
o MISUNDERSTANDING (1972).
the severity of punishment, g(B), for a given
behavior. One of the ways this is accomplished is
by reducing the severity of the offense charged. In
many jurisdictions, an individual arrested for theft
is often charged with the trio of burglary, larceny
and receiving or possessing stolen property. Bur-
glary requires the most rigid standards of proof
for conviction and carries the most severe sen-
tences, and the opposite is true for stolen-goods
offenses. In the face of a general property-crime
arrest rate increase of about 8 percent per year
over the decade, and an increase over the decade
of 62 percent in burglary arrests and 108 percent in
larceny arrests, the rate of increase in stolen-goods
arrests has been about 359 percent. Thus, it would
appear that many individuals who formerly would
have been charged with burglary or larceny are
being charged with the less serious offense of re-
ceiving stolen goods.
This whole process of a-stabilization is funda-
mentally an implicit one. There is no individual or
body within the society that says "our a is too high,
let us revise our g(B) function or our Bo's." Rather,
this description merely reflects the marginal
changes resulting from an intricate, continuous
process in which a complex of social forces, con-
tinually in conflict, win and lose a series of small
battles. Certainly judicial authority represents a
significant factor in these outcomes. The sequence
of liberal criminal law decisions of the Warren
Court did their share to maintain a. By making it
harder to convict a defendant, they presumably re-
duced the conviction function, C(B). One of the
results of this was an increase in the need for
better evidence to warrant conviction, and the
consequent use of lesser arrest charges like re-
ceiving stolen goods.
POLIcY CONJECrURES AND SUMMARY
Evidence seems to be developing that the United
States crime rate increases of the 1960's are leveling
off and may even begin to decline. It is still an open
question how much of this can be attributed to
demographic effects (e.g., aging of the population)
and how much to resources committed to the en-
forcement or prevention activities engendered by
the public concern over the problem of crime. If,
however, we do hypothesize that the United States
behavior distribution is now shifting to the left (i.e.,
less crime is occurring), then some conjectures are




The initial consequences of the shift to the left
would first be a temporary reduction in a, followed
by an adaptation to more severe punishment and
more rigid threshholds to restore a to its normal
value. Statements by public officials in early 1973
have called for life imprisonment and mandatory
minimum sentences for certain offenses like traf-
ficking in narcotics. Shifts to greater restrictiveness
in the Bo thresholds are also possible. There may
be a tightening in the recently loosened controls
over the victim crimes. It may even be more likely
that some forms of behavior like ecological nuisance
activity will become increasingly of concern to the
criminal law. It is unlikely that the larger criminal
justice establishment created with federal funds
through the Law Enforcement Assistance Ad-
ministration will let itself become bored from in-
activitv. If other service activities are not found
into which to divert those resources, then they are
likely to assure that a is at least maintained.
If, on the other hand, the behavior distribution
continues to shift to the right, then we can reason-
ably expect to see increasing pressure for the
decriminalization of the victimless crimes.
In this paper, we have critically reexamined
Durkheim's claim of the existence of stable levels
of crime and offered an alternative argument for
the stability of punishment. We have presented a
theoretical structure which characterizes deviant
behavior and society's response to it in terms of a
multidimensional behavior distribution which can
vary over time. We have hypothesized and pro-
vided some empirical evidence to support a con-
servation theory that suggests that society tries to
impose a fairly constant level of punishment, at a
rate a, and that the behavior it punishes responds
to shifts in the behavior distribution. The punish-
ment should vary between societies and should
reflect consideration of a society's homogeneity
and its permissiveness toward deviance.
As the behavior distribution of the society be-
comes more deviant, then in order to maintain a
constant a, there must be a slackening of the
behavior thresholds that warranted punishment
in the past, or a reduction in the severity of the
punishment for a given offense. Since these changes
in thresholds or in severity can be chosen reason-
ably independently, we would expect to see more
flexibility in the treatment of the victimless crimes
than of the victim crimes, and these changes are in
fact reflected in arrest data.
Clearly, further development of this theory is
needed. There should be consideration of the dif-
ferences in the behavior of different demographic
groups and their differing vulnerability to punish-
ment. Further development is needed to identify
factors that influence the characteristic punishment
rate of a society. Dynamic analysis is needed to ac-
count for the time lags in the response process, and
the effect this may have on cyclical aspects of the
punishment rate.
More fundamentally, the theory still requires
further empirical validation. Some account must
be taken of other modes of punishment than im-
prisonment. The constancy of the punishment
rate must be tested in settings other than the
United States and Norway. And the response proc-
ess shown with United States arrest data for
victimless crimes must also be tested in other
societies. Based on the limited validation thus far
available, however, this theoretical construct ap-
pears to be an important extension and significant
modification of the perceptions of Durkheim as
evolved by Erikson.
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